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A Restatement of Health Care Law 
David Orentlicher† 
INTRODUCTION 
While the value of a health care law Restatement may 
once have been uncertain, that is no longer the case. With 
advances in research and technology, health care has become 
an increasingly important factor in the economy and legal 
system of the United States. National spending has risen to 
more than 2.7 trillion dollars a year (about 18% of GDP),1 and 
health care law now encompasses a broad range of key doctrines, 
from medical malpractice and end-of-life decision making to 
health care financing and food and drug regulation. As health 
care and the laws that govern it have increased in importance, 
the value of a Restatement of Health Care Law has grown as 
well. There would be much to be gained from a health care law 
restatement. It could: 
 Serve the traditional Restatement roles of describing the 
landscape for central doctrines in the field and shaping doctrinal 
reform (e.g., treatment withdrawal from incompetent persons or the 
scope of physician disclosures for informed consent) (Part I of this 
article), 
 Untangle complicated doctrines and indicate how the law could 
be streamlined (e.g., ERISA) (Part II), and 
 Indicate when health care exceptionalism makes sense (e.g., 
public health regulations or health care antitrust law) (Part III). 
A health care law Restatement would enhance its 
contributions substantially by considering not only legal principle 
and doctrine but also empirical evidence. Many legal issues in 
 
 † Samuel R. Rosen Professor and Co-Director, Center for Law and Health, 
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. Adjunct Professor of Medicine, 
Indiana University School of Medicine. MD, JD, Harvard University. I am grateful for very 
helpful comments from Syd Arak, Mark Hall, Jessica Mantel, and Robert Olick and 
excellent editing by John D. Moore, Michael Tse, Sabrina Margret Bierer & Scott A. Foletta. 
 1 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE DATA, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 
2013). 
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health care can be better understood by considering how health 
care decisions are actually made, whether by patients, 
physicians, hospitals, or other participants in the health care 
system. By incorporating the lessons of empirical studies, 
authors of a health care law Restatement would place their 
analyses on much firmer ground. 
I. DESCRIBING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
For a number of important doctrines in health care law, 
states have developed legal rules that overlap to some extent 
but also diverge on key principles. A Restatement could provide 
courts, legislators, practitioners, and scholars with a very helpful 
understanding of the legal landscape for these doctrines. The 
right to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn and the scope 
of disclosure for informed consent are good examples. In addition, 
by exploring the justifications for the different legal rules and 
examining the light that empirical evidence sheds, a Restatement 
could indicate how the law should develop in the future.2 
A. Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment 
Since the Karen Quinlan case in 1976,3  the right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment has become firmly established, 
as state and federal courts have answered a number of questions 
in a common way. For example, the right to refuse does not vary 
with the patient’s medical condition—whether young and 
relatively healthy or old and terminally ill, all individuals may 
decline unwanted health care, even if death may result. Similarly, 
the right does not depend on whether the treatment is complex 
and very invasive, such as artificial ventilation or surgery, or 
simple and not very intrusive, such as antibiotics or a blood 
transfusion. Undoubtedly, patients’ decisions will be influenced 
by their prognoses and the kinds of treatment at stake, but 
those are factors for individuals to weigh for themselves.4 
The consensus on the right to refuse treatment begins to 
unravel when the right is invoked on behalf of patients who have 
 
 2 Indeed, Restatements have long done more than simply restate the law. At 
times, they influence reforms of the law by siding with positions that have been taken by 
a minority, rather than majority, of courts. Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the 
Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 149-50 (1969); Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 196-97 (1987). 
 3 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
 4 MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH 
CARE LAW AND ETHICS 527, 536-40 (8th ed. 2013) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE LAW]. 
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lost decision-making capacity. A person suffering from dementia 
or other cognitive impairments retains the right, but states vary 
when it comes to the rules that they employ for deciding when 
life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from a 
mentally incapacitated patient.5 
In particular, states diverge when patients can no longer 
speak for themselves and they have not left clear evidence of 
their wishes. When patients have written a living will, 
appointed a surrogate decision maker, or clearly expressed their 
preferences in other ways, those preferences govern. The law 
looks for guidance from the patients themselves. But in the 
absence of “clear and convincing evidence,” 6  different states 
take different approaches. 
In some states, courts or legislatures have concluded 
that treatment decisions should be guided as much as possible 
by the patient’s preferences and values. In these states, family 
members or other surrogate decision makers may draw on their 
understanding of what the patient likely would desire to make 
a “substituted” judgment for the patient and decide whether to 
authorize treatment.7 
In other states, decisions are to be made on the basis of 
the patient’s best interests. In these states, treatment decisions 
are guided by the surrogate’s objective balancing of the benefits 
and harms of treatment.8 
Several states have taken a more nuanced approach, 
with different standards depending on the patient’s medical 
condition. The better the prognosis, the more difficult it is to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. On one hand, 
if patients are terminally ill or permanently unconscious, then 
surrogates are able to authorize or refuse life-sustaining 
treatment based on their sense of the patient’s preferences. But 
if the patient is neither terminally ill nor permanently 
unconscious (e.g., has Alzheimer’s disease and is expected to live 
for a few more years), then treatment generally must be 
provided. This nuanced approach reflects an important trend, 
with adoption in several states, either by courts, as in California, 
 
 5 Id. at 570. 
 6 Courts across the states will rely on the patient’s previously expressed 
wishes when there is clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s wishes. Id. at 570. 
 7 Id. at 572. Questions can arise when family members disagree, and court 
battles can ensue. See, e.g., In re Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(disagreement between patient’s husband and her parents). 
 8 HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 570. 
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Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, or by 
legislatures, as in Illinois, Maryland, and New York.9 
Some states add an additional nuance. There tends to be 
little resistance when family members or other surrogates 
refuse major surgery, artificial ventilation, or other aggressive 
treatment for seriously ill patients. But legislators and courts 
are more likely to object when surrogates want to withhold 
artificial nutrition and hydration.10 
There would be considerable benefit alone from a 
thorough and authoritative description of the rules for 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. Scholars vary in their 
characterization of existing doctrine, 11  and a Restatement 
would be valuable to courts and legislatures trying to reconcile 
the differences in viewpoint. 
Might there be even greater benefit if a Restatement 
encouraged the development of legal rules in one direction or 
another? Restatements often have served as important 
advocates for legal reform, and there is much at stake with 
decisions about treatment at the end of life. 
On the basis of principle, there are good arguments for 
all of the different approaches to decision making for 
incompetent patients who have not left clear expressions of their 
wishes. For example, relying on an assessment of the patient’s 
likely preferences is most consistent with the principles of self-
determination that undergird the right to refuse treatment. A 
best interest standard, on the other hand, recognizes that 
people’s interests change over time and that people’s 
preferences when they are healthier or younger may not serve 
their interests well when they become much sicker or older. 
Rather than have surrogates act on the basis of what they 
think patients would want, it is argued, the law should instruct 
surrogates to weigh the benefits and burdens of proposed care 
and agree to treatment as long as patients can get some 
 
 9 Id. at 572-75. 
 10 Id. at 582, 585; see also Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 423-24 (Mo. 
1988). In most of the nutrition and hydration cases, the courts do not limit their 
holdings to withdrawal of nutrition or hydration, but indicate that their standards 
apply to any life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 
151, 175 (Cal. 2001); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 413 (Mich. 1995). Nevertheless, 
court challenges are less likely to arise for treatments more aggressive than artificial 
nutrition and hydration, such as major heart surgery. 
 11 Compare HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 573-74 (observing that the 
nuanced approach, with its different standards based on the patient’s medical 
condition, has become the predominant one), with ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. 
CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING 4-15 (3d 
ed. Supp. 2009) (describing substituted judgment as the predominant approach). 
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enjoyment from life (e.g., from their interactions with others) 
and are not suffering from pain or other discomfort from their 
illnesses or treatments.12 
But if principle is indeterminate, consideration of 
empirical evidence can point us in one direction or another. For 
example, we know that patients when healthy underestimate 
the quality of life that they will experience if they become 
disabled. Previously expressed wishes may not be as good a 
guide as we think for medical treatment decisions.13 And people 
tend to recognize that. A number of studies have found that 
most patients do not want their family members and physicians 
to follow their wishes strictly. Patients typically want their 
surrogate decision makers to have some or even a great deal of 
leeway to make their own judgments about what is best for the 
patients.14 In other words, empirical evidence suggests that a 
best interests standard makes more sense than a substituted 
judgment standard for patients who have not left clear and 
convincing evidence of their wishes (and even so for patients 
who have left clear evidence of their wishes). 
In sum, a thoughtful synthesis of legal principle and 
empirical evidence can provide considerable benefit to those 
trying to understand or improve the rules that govern end-of-
life decision making. 
A Restatement for health care law also could clarify and 
guide legal doctrine for informed consent. 
B. Informed Consent and Physician-Specific 
Characteristics 
When physicians recommend coronary artery bypass 
surgery or other procedures, they must obtain their patients’ 
informed consent before proceeding. Principles of informed 
consent require physicians to disclose the expected benefits, 
potential risks, and other material information about the 
 
 12 Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-
Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 
L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 234, 240-43 (1989). 
 13 HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 576. 
 14 Id. at 576-77 (citing Christina M. Puchalski et al., Patients Who Want 
Their Family and Physician to Make Resuscitation Decisions for Them: Observations 
from SUPPORT and HELP, 48(5) J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC. S84 (2000); Ashwini Sehgal 
et al., How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want Their Advance Directives Followed?, 267 
JAMA 59 (1992); Daniel P. Sulmasy et al., How Would Terminally Ill Patients Have 
Others Make Decisions for Them in the Event of Decisional Incapacity, 55 J. AM. 
GERIATRICS SOC. 1981 (2007). Thus, even when patients have left clear expressions of 
their wishes, it is not clear that those wishes should govern. 
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proposed procedure. On this, there is a consensus in medical 
ethics and the law. But do the requirements of informed consent 
include disclosure by physicians of information about 
themselves?15 For example, must physicians tell patients how 
many times they have performed a particular surgery and 
what their success rates are? What about any history of alcohol 
abuse or the presence of conflicts of interest? There are a 
number of court decisions on this question, but doctrine 
remains unsettled. 
Considerations of principle suggest that physicians 
ought to disclose relevant information about themselves. The 
presence of a conflict of interest might influence the physician’s 
judgment and give a patient reason to discount the physician’s 
advice. Or a physician’s greater experience performing a 
particular procedure may make it more likely that surgery will 
have the desired effect. 
Yet, courts come down on both sides. Some require 
disclosure, while others do not. 16  Still other courts require 
disclosure only when patients ask.17 
For courts that do not require disclosure, patients learn 
about average benefits and risks of a proposed treatment but 
not about the potential benefits and risks that they actually 
face. These patients simply are not fully informed before they 
give consent. 
If a Restatement in health care law came down on the 
side of disclosure, it could push informed consent doctrine in 
that direction. Doctrine would line up better with principle. 
But that may not be the best result. It turns out that 
faithful adherence to principles of informed consent may lead 
at times to counterproductive results. For example, consider 
the potential impact when physicians disclose to patients that 
they have a financial conflict of interest.18 Studies that look at 
 
 15 Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed 
Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999); Marc D. 
Ginsberg, Informed Consent: No Longer Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 15 MICH. ST. 
U. J. MED. & L. 17, 20 (2010). 
 16 HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 239-43. 
 17 See, e.g., Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 800 A.2d 73, 85 (N.J. 2002) 
(recognizing cause of action when patient alleged that physician misrepresented his 
credentials and experience after being asked about them). 
 18 Financial conflicts of interest for physicians refer to situations in which a 
doctor’s professional judgment might be influenced by the potential for personal 
economic gain. Aaron S. Kesselheim & David Orentlicher, Insights from a National 
Conference: “Conflicts of Interest in the Practice of Medicine,” 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
436, 436-37 (2012). For example, if a physician owns an MRI machine, the physician 
may be more likely to recommend MRI scans than if the physician referred patients to 
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the effect of such disclosures find that disclosure may make 
physicians less concerned about their conflicts and patients more 
likely to agree to treatment. Once having disclosed their 
conflicts, physicians may feel that they have satisfied their 
moral obligations and therefore may feel freer to take action 
that the financial incentive encourages. For patients, the 
disclosure may make it difficult to take the conflict into 
account. Patients may worry that a refusal of the physician’s 
recommendation will be seen as a sign that the patient does not 
trust the physician, that the patient believes the conflict clouds 
the physician’s judgment. Patients may not want to offend the 
physician and therefore may agree to treatment from the 
physician when they really would prefer to decline.19 
Perhaps the answer to the problem of counterproductive 
disclosures would be to rely less on physician disclosure and 
more on other ways to protect patients. For example, if 
physician disclosures may embolden physicians and inhibit 
patients, we could turn to other ways for patients to become 
informed. Indeed, steps already are being taken to do just that. 
Governmental and independent bodies publish “report cards” 
based on measures of the quality of care provided, which can 
inform patients about their doctors.20 In addition, under the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), the federal government will publish 
data online about payments from pharmaceutical, medical 
device, and biotechnology companies to doctors.21  
Besides making it possible for patients to learn about 
their physicians from sources other than the physicians 
themselves, concerns about physicians’ personal characteristics 
can be addressed in other ways. Insurers can play an important 
role. If a patient needs a complicated surgical procedure, the 
patient’s insurer can identify a list of well-qualified physicians 
                                                                                                                                     
independent facilities for their MRI scans. Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose & 
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Effect of Financial Relationships on the Behaviors of Health Care 
Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 452, 453-54 (2012). 
 19 Sunita Sah, Conflicts of Interest and Your Physician: Psychological 
Processes That Cause Unexpected Changes in Behavior, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 482, 
485-86 (2012); Sunita Sah et al., The Burden of Disclosure: Increased Compliance with 
Distrusted Advice, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 289 (2013). 
 20 Twerski & Cohen, supra note 15, at 3-5. 
 21 Meredith B. Rosenthal & Michelle M. Mello, Sunlight as Disinfectant—
New Rules on Disclosure of Industry Payments to Physicians, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2052, 2052 (2013). It appears that the looming online publication of payments led a 
major pharmaceutical company, Glaxo, to eliminate payments to physicians for giving 
presentations about its drugs to other physicians. Katie Thomas, Glaxo Says It Will 
Stop Paying Doctors To Promote Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/business/glaxo-says-it-will-stop-paying-doctors-to-
promote-drugs.html?smid=pl-share. 
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from which the patient could choose.22 Or patients could be 
protected from serious conflicts of interest by prohibitions 
against the conflicts. 23  Under ethical guidelines and federal 
law, for example, physicians may not engage in a number of 
“self-referral” practices, such as referring patients for MRI scans 
to facilities in which the physicians hold investment interests.24 
As courts, legislators, and other policy makers consider 
their options for dealing with the risks that physicians may 
pose to their patients from inexperience, conflicts of interest, or 
other factors, a health care law Restatement could provide much 
needed guidance. And that guidance would be on stronger 
ground if it reflected both principle and empirical evidence. 
II. UNTANGLING COMPLICATED DOCTRINES 
Legal rules are never as precise as we might like, and 
health care law has its share of fuzzy doctrine. A Restatement 
could help courts, legislators, practitioners, and scholars by 
untangling existing judicial opinions to the extent that 
untangling is possible. In addition, to the extent that there are 
unresolved questions, a Restatement could suggest how doctrine 
should be developed in a way that best serves the interests of 
patients and providers of health care services. The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides a 
useful example.25 
A. ERISA 
For decades, courts and health care law scholars have 
struggled with the application of ERISA to health care 
 
 22 Some insurers already do this by requiring patients to receive advanced care 
at centers of excellence. Centers of excellence are hospitals or other health care facilities 
that provide high quality care to their patients. James C. Robinson & Kimberly 
MacPherson, Payers Test Reference Pricing and Centers of Excellence to Steer Patients to 
Low-Price and High-Quality Providers, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2028, 2029-30 (2012). 
 23 Bernard Lo, The Future of Conflicts of Interest: A Call for Professional 
Standards, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 441, 448 (2012). 
 24 United States v. Tuomey Healthcare System, 675 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(interpreting Stark self-referral statute, 42 U.S.C. 1395nn); Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Conflicts of Interest: Physician 
Ownership of Medical Facilities, 267 JAMA 2366 (1992). Ethical guidelines also limit 
gifts from industry to physicians; see also Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 
American Medical Association, Guidelines on Gifts to Physicians from Industry: An 
Update, 47 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 445 (1992). 
 25 Fraud and abuse law also suffers from a good deal of uncertainty. HEALTH 
CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 1385-86. A Restatement of Health Care Law would be very 
helpful for that body of law as well. 
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regulation. Although the passage of ERISA was driven by 
concerns about abuses in private pension plans,26 the act also 
covers other employee fringe benefits, including health care 
benefits.27 ERISA created a uniform regime of federal regulation 
to supplant the patchwork of state regulation for employee 
benefit plans.28 However, many problems of interpretation have 
arisen for ERISA and health care benefits because the statute 
does not purport to regulate insurance.29 On one hand, ERISA 
is supposed to preempt any state law that “relates to” an 
employee benefit plan and substitute ERISA’s framework of 
federal regulation. 30  But on the other hand, the statute’s 
preemption of state law does not extend to state insurance 
law—ERISA leaves insurance regulation to the states.31 
The exclusion of insurance leads to an important 
question. When states regulate the health care coverage that 
individuals receive from their employers, are the states 
regulating a fringe benefit of employment (not permitted under 
ERISA), or are they regulating insurance (permitted under 
ERISA)? And it gets even more complicated. A state may argue 
that ERISA preemption is not triggered at all for a state law 
since the state is regulating doctors or hospitals rather than 
health care coverage. Or an employer may be able to escape the 
state regulation of health care insurance that is permitted 
under ERISA by self-insuring.32 
Given all of the complexities of ERISA and health care, 
a Restatement would be very helpful simply by sorting through 
the different judicial interpretations and indicating how they play 
out. In addition, to the extent that current interpretations leave 
uncertainty about the application of ERISA, a Restatement could 
recommend an optimal application. 
This article will consider how a Restatement could address 
the problem of small employers, self-insurance, and ERISA. 
 
 26 David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in 
Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 443-48 (1987). 
 27 See Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 1997); Timothy 
Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self Insurance for Small Employers Under the Affordable Care 
Act: Federal and State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2070883. 
 28 HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 1060. 
 29 Jost & Hall, supra note 27 (manuscript at 10-11). 
 30 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2011). 
 31 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
 32 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(b)(2)(A)); Jost & Hall, supra note 27 (manuscript at 11). 
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B. Self-Insured Small Employers 
As mentioned, ERISA allows employers to escape state 
regulation of health care insurance by self-insuring.33 At the 
time of ERISA’s enactment, only four percent of employees 
received their coverage through self-insured plans.34 Since the 
enactment of ERISA, self-insurance has become much more 
common for employers, with 60% of employees in self-insured 
plans in 2012.35 
Traditionally, self-insurance has been much more 
prevalent among large employers. According to one study, less 
than one in six workers in firms with fewer than 101 employees 
were enrolled in self-insured plans, while more than three in five 
workers in firms with more than 500 employees were enrolled in 
self-insured plans.36 A more recent study pegged self-insurance at 
93% for workers at firms with at least 5,000 employees but only 
15% for workers at firms with 3-199 employees.37 
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, self-
insurance has become much more attractive for many small 
employers. ACA imposes standard “community ratings” for 
health care insurance, which reflect the costs of all persons, 
including relatively sick people.38 Self-insured employers bear 
the costs of their employees only. Thus, for small employers 
with a relatively healthy workforce, health care costs will be 
lower from self-insurance than from purchasing an insurance 
policy, and these employers will have a strong incentive to take 
 
 33 There are other benefits to self-insuring as well, including greater control 
over plan design and administration and lower administrative costs. Troy Paredes, 
Note, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope of Federal 
Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 249 (1997). 
 34 Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good 
Loophole Deserves Another,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 108 (2005). 
 35 Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits: 2012 Annual Survey 
§ 10 (Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2012-section-10/#. 
 36 Gregory Acs, Stephen H. Long, M. Susan Marquis & Pamela Farley Short, 
Self-Insured Employer Health Plans: Prevalence, Profile, Provisions, and Premiums, 15 
HEALTH AFF. 266, 269 (1996). 
 37 Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 35, at Exhibit 10.3; see also 
Matthew Buettgens & Linda J. Blumberg, Small Firm Self-Insurance Under the 
Affordable Care Act, COMMONWEALTH FUND ISSUE BRIEF 4 (Nov. 2012) (observing that 
“[c]urrent stop-loss plans generally require firms to accept a significant amount of risk, 
so self-insurance is much less common among small firms than among large ones”). 
 38 In other words, ACA solves the problems that currently exist for sick 
individuals or employer groups with relatively unhealthy workers who face 
unaffordable premiums for health care insurance. Instead of charging people or groups 
based on their own expected costs of care, insurers will calculate standard, community 
rates for all customers. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 
(2012). There will be some variation in premiums, based on age, costs of care in the 
geographic region, and whether people smoke or not. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a) (2011). 
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the self-insurance route.39 Moreover, these employers need not 
worry about the possibility that some of their employees will 
become unexpectedly sick and that their health care costs will 
become unaffordable. If a small employer’s workforce becomes 
relatively unhealthy, the employer can abandon self-insurance 
and purchase a community-rated plan at an ACA health care 
insurance exchange. In other words, employers can self-insure 
when it is cheaper to do so and purchase insurance when that 
alternative is cheaper. 
The self-insurance option poses two significant problems 
for health care policy. First, it may compromise ACA’s goal of 
making insurance more affordable for small employers. Before 
ACA, there were many obstacles to affordable health care 
coverage for small employers. Small groups have less 
negotiating leverage, they face higher administrative costs, and 
because their costs are less predictable, insurers charge more to 
cover the greater actuarial uncertainty.40 For businesses whose 
employees have significant medical needs, the costs of health 
care coverage are even higher. ACA addresses these obstacles by 
creating a single, large risk pool for small employers and 
requiring insurers to charge the standard community rate to 
all small employers.41 But if small employers can stay out of the 
risk pool when they have healthy employees and enter the risk 
pool when they have unhealthy employees, they can engage in 
the kind of adverse selection that destabilizes health care 
insurance markets—if only unhealthy workforces purchase 
insurance, health care premiums rise and become less 
affordable, causing the least unhealthy workforces to drop out of 
the market and driving prices higher again.42 
Self-insured employers can undermine ACA in a second 
way. By self-insuring, small employers can avoid many of the 
consumer-protection regulations passed by ACA. For example, 
self-insured plans are not bound by ACA’s requirement that at 
least 80 or 85% of premium revenues be spent on medical 
 
 39 Insurance costs will be lower also because self-insured employers will not 
have to pay the annual premium surcharge that ACA imposes on health insurers and 
because self-insured employers will not have to meet the essential health benefit 
requirements of ACA. Employees in a relatively healthy workforce may be satisfied 
with a more parsimonious plan. Buettgens & Blumberg, supra note 37, at 4-5. 
 40 Jost & Hall, supra note 32, at 2. 
 41 Id. at 2-5. ACA also addresses the problem of health care insurance being 
unaffordable for small employers with low-wage employees by expanding Medicaid 
eligibility, providing subsidies for low-income workers who make too much to qualify for 
Medicaid, and providing tax credits for small employers that provide health care coverage. 
 42 Id. at 10; Buettgens & Blumberg, supra note 37, at 5. 
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benefits as opposed to administrative costs or profits (the 
“medical loss ratio” requirement).43 
Some states have tried to prevent small firms from 
exploiting the self-insurance option by regulating the “stop-
loss” policies that play an integral role in self-insurance. Small 
employers cannot afford to truly self-insure—they could be 
financially devastated if just a few employees incur very high 
medical costs. Hence, self-insured employers purchase stop-loss 
policies that transfer their liability for any very high costs that 
their employees might incur.44 States have limited the use of 
stop-loss policies by setting minimum “attachment” points at 
which a stop-loss policy can kick in. For example, the regulation 
might require employers to cover the first $30,000 for each 
employee. With minimum attachment points, employers are able 
to take advantage of the self-insurance option only if they are 
truly engaged in self-insurance. 
In other words, imposing attachment points does not 
represent unfairness to small employers. The regulation of stop-
loss policies simply prevents small employers from purporting to 
self-insure but shifting most of the risk to an insurance 
company and therefore not really self-insuring. 
C. ERISA and a Restatement 
While regulations of stop-loss policies can preserve the 
viability of the small group health insurance market, and a 
number of states have enacted such regulations, some court 
decisions have cast a cloud on their acceptability under ERISA. 
A Restatement of Health Care Law could be important in lifting 
that cloud. 
In a leading case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit rejected a Maryland regulation that set a 
minimum attachment point for stop-loss policies that 
employers purchased for their health care coverage.45 According 
to the court, Maryland tried to regulate employee health benefit 
 
 43 Jost & Hall, supra note 32, at 9; SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF & JANEMARIE 
MULVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42735, MEDICAL LOSS RATIO REQUIREMENTS 
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA): ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 2 (2012) (describing 80% medical loss ratio for small group plans and 85% 
medical loss ratio for large groups). 
 44 Stop-loss policies can be written on a per-employee basis or on an 
aggregate basis. Thus, for example, the stop-loss policy might cover the costs above 
$20,000 for any one employee, or the policy might cover all costs that exceed an 
aggregate of $200,000 for the company. Buettgens & Blumberg, supra note 37, at 3; 
Jost & Hall, supra note 32, at 13-14. Large employers also purchase stop-loss policies. 
 45 Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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plans (impermissible under ERISA) rather than insurance 
(permissible under ERISA) even though the regulations were 
“carefully drafted to focus directly on insurance companies 
issuing stop-loss insurance and not on the employee benefit 
plans themselves.” 46  In the Fourth Circuit’s view, if states 
cannot regulate employee benefit plans directly, they also 
cannot do so indirectly. Under the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, 
small employers can continue to exploit the self-insurance 
option and undermine the goals of ACA. 
To be sure, some courts have noted that there must be 
limits to a principle that rejects indirect regulation of employee 
benefit plans. Otherwise, ERISA’s preemption of employee 
benefit plan regulation by states would swallow its exemption 
for regulation of state insurance law. The Maryland regulation 
suffered not only from its indirect effect on employee health 
plans but also from language that specifically targeted employee 
health plans rather than insurance policies in general.47 Hence, 
the legislature responded to the Fourth Circuit’s decision by 
reenacting a minimum attachment point for stop-loss policies 
without tying the regulation of stop-loss policies to their use in 
employee benefit plans. 48  The new provision has not been 
challenged, and there is a good argument to be made that it 
solves the problems with the regulation that the Fourth Circuit 
struck down.49  Other states also have enacted regulations of 
stop-loss policies that appear to avoid the problems of the earlier 
Maryland provision. In this view, states can regulate the use of 
self-insurance by small employers as long as they reserve their 
regulation for the insurers that sell the stop-loss policies. 
While careful drafting of stop-loss regulations seems to 
solve the self-insurance problem, there is still significant 
uncertainty. Some courts have signaled their approval, while 
others have not.50 With the different responses by courts, and 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 For example, the regulation’s coverage section had two parts, one of which 
described health insurance policies issued to employers, the other of which described stop-
loss health insurance policies issued to employers. See 22 MD. REG. 913 (June 9, 1995). 
 48 MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 15-129 (West 2013). 
 49 HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 1061; Jost & Hall, supra note 32, at 
17-18; Korobkin, supra note 34, at 127-28. Actually, the new regulation was challenged 
by the same insurance company that challenged the original Maryland regulation, but 
the court dismissed the challenge as not being ripe, and the plaintiff withdrew from the 
Maryland insurance market instead of refiling the challenge at a later date. Korobkin, 
supra 34, at 128. 
 50 Compare, e.g., Wash. Physicians Serv. Ass’n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039, 
1045 (9th Cir. 1998), with Hotz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 292 F.3d 57, 
59-60 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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the uncertainty about the application of ERISA preemption, 
many states may be reluctant to regulate stop-loss policies. A 
Restatement of Health Care could do much to reduce this 
reluctance if it took the view that regulations like the current 
Maryland statute are permissible under ERISA. As a result, 
access to affordable insurance under ACA would be better 
protected from compromise by small employers who take the 
self-insurance route. 
III. HEALTH CARE EXCEPTIONALISM 
Historically, legal doctrine has treated questions arising 
in health care differently than when they arise in other areas. 
For example, while corporations have been free to hire lawyers 
or other professionals, the corporate practice of medicine 
doctrine prevented businesses from employing physicians.51 And 
at one time, physicians and hospitals did not need to worry 
about liability under antitrust law for anticompetitive 
behavior.52 However, the law has eliminated much of the special 
treatment that it reserved for the health care sector. In the mid-
1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court began to apply 
antitrust law to physicians and other health care providers.53 In 
addition, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has been 
relaxed to some extent, and many hospitals employ physicians 
today.54 Just last year, the Supreme Court rejected an opportunity 
to view health care insurance as deserving exceptional treatment 
under the Commerce Clause when it considered the 
constitutionality of ACA’s individual mandate to purchase health 
care coverage.55 Physicians and other health care providers may 
be special professionals and hold themselves to distinctive 
standards of ethics, but they also share many attributes with 
other people who are engaged in a profit-seeking business. The 
similarities between health care and other services often are 
more important than the differences. 
 
 51 MARK A. HALL, IRA MARK ELLMAN & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE 
LAW AND ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 224 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter NUTSHELL]. 
 52 HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 1312 (also observing that health care 
antitrust exceptionalism reflected in part a broader principle of special treatment for 
the professions). 
 53 HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 1312-13 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975), Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Tr’s of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 
(1976), and Am. Med. Ass’n v. FTC, 455 U.S. 676 (1982)). 
 54 NUTSHELL, supra note 51, at 228. 
 55 Abigail R. Moncrieff, Understanding the Failure of Health-care 
Exceptionalism in the Supreme Court’s Obamacare Decision, 142 CHEST 559 (Sept. 2012). 
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This section of the article considers the evolution of 
health care exceptionalism in public health law and health care 
antitrust law and discusses how a Restatement could encourage 
courts to better reflect the ways in which health care is both 
different from, and similar to, other sectors of the economy. 
Courts today do not give sufficient consideration to health care 
exceptionalism when applying the “commercial speech” doctrine 
to public health regulations.56 And with health care antitrust 
law, courts are too willing to invoke health care exceptionalism 
at times and not willing enough to do so at other times. 
A. The First Amendment and the Public’s Health 
In the past, courts allowed the government broad 
authority to regulate on behalf of the public health.57 In Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts,58 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of a mandatory vaccination statute under a 
standard of rational basis review.59 According to the Court, the 
statute was permissible because it did not represent an 
“unusual, . . . unreasonable or arbitrary, requirement.” 60  For a 
more recent illustration of a broad governmental authority to 
protect the public’s health, consider that Congress was allowed to 
prohibit all cigarette advertising on television or radio in a 1969 
statute that took effect in 1971.61 
Over the past couple of decades, however, courts have 
looked more skeptically at public health regulations when 
hearing challenges to the regulations. For example, a three-
judge panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
held that terminally ill patients should have greater access to 
experimental drugs than allowed by Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) rules.62 And as a result of the Supreme 
 
 56 Commercial speech refers to speech uttered by businesses to promote their 
products or services to potential customers. Advertising is the prototypical form of 
commercial speech. David Orentlicher, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health 
Regulation: The Clash Between the Public Interest in a Robust First Amendment and the 
Public Interest in Effective Protection from Harm, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 299, 307 (2011). 
 57 Id. at 299. 
 58 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 59 Rational basis review is the most lenient standard for review under the 
Constitution. Statutes rarely fail to survive such review. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 625-28, 678 (3d ed. 2006). 
 60 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27. 
 61 Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d, 405 
U.S. 1000 (1972). 
 62 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von 
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). To be sure, the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc reversed the panel’s decision 15 
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Court’s invigoration of the commercial speech doctrine, the 
federal and state governments often have been stymied in their 
efforts to protect the public’s health. The commercial speech 
doctrine substantially limits the authority of government to 
regulate the advertising or other promotional practices of the 
pharmaceutical and tobacco industries.63 Congress cannot prevent 
pharmacists from widely advertising their compounding services 
for prescription drugs,64 and state legislators cannot prevent drug 
company sales representatives from using data from patient 
prescriptions to target their promotional pitches to physicians.65 
In addition, the FDA cannot impose the graphic warnings on 
cigarette packages that it unveiled in 2011.66 
While the government may have had too much freedom 
in the past to exercise its public health regulatory authority,67 
it appears that courts have swung too far in the other direction. 
Recent decisions have made it too difficult for legislators and 
agencies to protect the public health. The examples of prescription 
data mining and cigarette warnings are illustrative. 
1. Prescription Data Mining 
For some time, health policy scholars have worried 
about the marketing activities of pharmaceutical companies. A 
number of studies have indicated that advertising and other 
promotional efforts unduly influence physician prescribing 
practices. Physicians may prescribe drugs or devices that are 
more expensive, less effective, or less safe than alternative 
options; they also may prescribe a drug or device when none is 
                                                                                                                                     
months later, but the litigation led the FDA to relax its limitations on access to 
experimental drugs. George J. Annas, Cancer and the Constitution—Choice at Life’s 
End, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 408, 411 (2007). 
 63 David Orentlicher, The FDA’s Graphic Tobacco Warnings and the First 
Amendment, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 204, 204 (2013). 
 64 Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). Congress was 
concerned about pharmacies using their authority under state law to create 
medications (through a process known as compounding) to evade rules requiring 
testing of experimental new drugs before they are marketed to the public. Normally, 
compounding is used for individual patients whose needs cannot be met by 
commercially available drugs. Id. at 360-62. Congressional concerns about problems 
with compounding were realized in 2012 when large-scale compounding resulted in 
many patients suffering serious infections of fungal meningitis. Kevin Outterson, 
Regulating Compounding Pharmacies After NECC, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1969 (2012). 
 65 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (invalidating a 
Vermont statute). 
 66 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 67 Jacobson’s rational basis review was too deferential to legislative judgment. 
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needed.68 As a result, patients may suffer unnecessary harm to 
their health or their pocketbooks. 
One marketing practice has raised particular concern 
because it entails the use of sensitive health information. Health 
information companies collect data about patient prescriptions 
from pharmacies and analyze the prescribing practices of 
individual physicians. The companies sell their analyses to 
pharmaceutical firms whose sales representatives can then 
better target their promotional pitches to doctors. If a 
salesperson is touting a drug to treat diabetes, for example, the 
salesperson would be interested in knowing which physicians 
frequently write prescriptions for diabetes drugs and whether 
physicians favor the company’s drug or the drugs of other 
companies. The data analyses also can tell salespersons when a 
physician switches from the company’s drug to another drug.69 
This “mining” of prescription data does not violate 
privacy laws because the patients’ names are stripped from the 
collection of data. But the mining does compromise a key 
rationale for the confidentiality of patient information. Physicians 
promise that what their patients tell them will be protected from 
disclosure to others and will be used only for the benefit of the 
patients. This promise of confidentiality is critical to ensuring 
that people feel comfortable revealing information that is very 
sensitive. But when prescription data are used for marketing 
by pharmaceutical companies, patient information is used in 
ways that can harm patient welfare.70 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected regulation of prescription 
data mining on the ground that the regulation targeted specific 
content (promotional practices) and particular speakers (drug 
companies).71 According to the Court, governmental regulation of 
 
 68 Jerry Avorn, Milton Chen & Robert Hartley, Scientific versus Commercial 
Sources of Influence on the Prescribing Behavior of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4 (1982); 
David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients’ Interests, 
38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 75-76 (2010) (citing Adolfo Figueiras, Francisco Caamaño & 
Juan Jesus Gestal-Otero, Influence of Physician’s Education, Drug Information and 
Medical-Care Settings on the Quality of Drugs Prescribed, 56 EURO. J. CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY 747, 750 (2000); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 378 (2000); see also Doron 
Sudarsky et al., The Impact of Industry Representative’s Visits on Utilization of 
Coronary Stents, 166 AM. HEART J. 258, 258, 262 (2013). 
 69 Orentlicher, supra note 68, at 74-75. 
 70 Orentlicher, supra note 56, at 311. 
 71 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663-64 (2011). 
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speech must not favor some speakers over other speakers and some 
messages over other messages.72 
However, some degree of health care exceptionalism 
would have been useful. For example, the Court might have 
recognized that health care information is more private than 
other kinds of information and therefore deserving of greater 
protection.73 Or the Court might have followed the model of its 
decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,74 in which 
it accorded deference to the views of public health officials.75 To 
be sure, Arline involved statutory rather than constitutional 
interpretation. But the Court has sometimes allowed a degree 
of deference to professional expertise even when applying 
constitutional strict scrutiny, 76  as when it deferred to the 
judgment of university officials on the value of diversity in 
higher education.77 A Restatement of Health Care Law could 
encourage courts to exercise greater deference to public health 
officials when deciding whether regulations of pharmaceutical 
marketing satisfy constitutional requirements. 
Greater deference to public health officials also would be 
helpful with warnings about the risks of smoking. 
2. Cigarette Warnings 
Tobacco use represents a major cause of preventable 
disease and death, and public health policies have done much to 
reduce the prevalence of cigarette smoking in the United States. 
As a result of high tobacco taxes and other measures, only 19% of 
adult Americans smoked in 2011, compared to 40% in 1965.78 
 
 72 Id. To be sure, the Court has upheld speaker-based restrictions in a 
number of situations. For example, the speech of government employees may be limited 
in ways that would not be tolerated for other persons. See, e.g., Connick v. Meyers, 461 
U.S. 138 (1983) (allowing dismissal of a local district attorney for questioning the 
internal policies of her office rather than speaking about matters of “public concern”); 
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (rejecting the posting of the Ten 
Commandments by county executives on the walls of their courthouses). 
 73 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1049, 1057-58 (2000). 
 74 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (deciding whether the firing of a school teacher with 
tuberculosis amounted to discrimination on the basis of a disability). 
 75 Id. at 288. 
 76 Strict scrutiny is the most exacting level of constitutional review. 
 77 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003) (upholding the 
affirmative action policy at University of Michigan Law School). 
 78 John P. Pierce et al., Prevalence of Heavy Smoking in California and the 
United States, 1965–2007, 305 JAMA 1106, 1106 (2011); Current Cigarette Smoking 
Among Adults—United States, 2011, 61(44) MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 889, 
889 (Nov. 9, 2012). 
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Congress has especially worried about cigarette 
manufacturers misleading consumers about the health risks of 
smoking. Advertising is banned on radio and television, 79 
deceptive claims are prohibited,80 and cigarette packages must 
include warnings about the health consequences of smoking.81 
Because of concerns that the standard textual warnings 
on a pack of cigarettes often are not read or understood, Congress 
in 2009 mandated graphic color images to accompany new textual 
warnings. Graphic warnings have been required in other 
countries and have been more effective than textual warnings at 
ensuring that people understand the risks of smoking.82 
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
rejected the graphic images in August 2012. According to the 
court, the image mandate represented an unconstitutional 
infringement on the First Amendment rights of tobacco 
companies—the government was trying to make cigarette 
manufacturers spend their own dollars to promote the 
government’s antismoking message.83 Rather than seek Supreme 
Court review, the FDA decided to withdraw its images and 
develop revised versions.84 
There is room for more deference to public health officials 
on the questions whether graphic images are warranted and 
which ones should be used. Public health experts are in a much 
better position than courts to analyze the empirical evidence and 
assess the effectiveness of different options for ensuring that 
consumers are properly informed about the risks of smoking.85 
To be sure, courts should not accept at face value the 
representations of public health officials. We should not return 
to the rational basis review of Jacobson. But courts should give 
 
 79 Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 585-86 (D.D.C. 1971), 
aff ’d sub nom. Capital Broad. Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
 80 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1214-16 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 81 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th 
Cir. 2012). 
 82 Id. at 564-66. One of the images depicted a dead man lying on an autopsy 
table. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, 696 F.3d at 1231 (2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 83 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, 696 F.3d at 1221-22 (majority opinion). Earlier, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the authority of Congress to 
require graphic warnings. But that court did not review the actual warnings that were 
issued. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, 674 F.3d at 552-53. 
 84 Carrie Printz, FDA Withdraws from Fight Over Graphic Warning Labels on 
Cigarette Packs, 119 CANCER 2361 (2013); available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ 
doi/10.102/cncr.28206/pdf. 
 85 And it’s not as if Congress rushed to use graphic warnings. Congress had 
tried to rely on the less intrusive requirement of textual warnings for many years 
before supplementing that requirement with its graphic images requirement. Disc. 
Tobacco City & Lottery, 674 F.3d at 526. 
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expert policy makers sufficient discretion to ensure that public 
health officials can take the steps necessary to safeguard the 
public’s health. 
A health care law Restatement could do much to guide 
the Supreme Court and lower courts as they further develop 
commercial speech principles. By recommending a meaningful 
degree of health care exceptionalism in First Amendment 
doctrine, a Restatement could help restore a better balance 
between First Amendment rights and public health needs. 
While courts have cut back too much on their recognition 
of health care exceptionalism in public health, they have shown 
tendencies toward both underuse and overuse of health care 
exceptionalism in health care antitrust law. The judicial 
approach to hospital mergers is illustrative. 
B. Antitrust Law and Hospital Mergers 
Health care antitrust scholars have worried about the 
ways in which federal judges have responded when the 
government has challenged mergers of hospitals on antitrust 
grounds. In the view of antitrust experts, courts have been too 
willing to approve mergers, with the public suffering the anti-
competitive effects of the consolidations.86  As the Affordable 
Care Act and other changes in health care encourage greater 
consolidation in the health care industry,87 it will become even 
more important for antitrust law to be applied correctly. 
To some extent, past judicial decisions reflect a failure 
to give adequate weight to the ways in which health care 
markets differ from other kinds of markets. For example, courts 
may assume that patients are quite responsive to differences in 
price among hospitals and therefore are willing to travel 
significant distances for care.88 But the highly personal nature of 
patient-physician relationships and the preference for hospital 
care close to one’s home can blunt patient sensitivity to the costs 
 
 86 Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of 
Competition Law in Health Care, 21(2) HEALTH AFF. 185 (2002); Peter J. Hammer & 
William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
545, 614-15 (2002); Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A 
Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 122-24 (2007). 
 87 For example, ACA encourages the formation of “accountable care 
organizations” in which hospitals, doctors, and other health care providers join 
together to provide integrated health care to patients. Victor R. Fuchs & Leonard D. 
Schaeffer, If Accountable Canizations Are the Answer, Who Should Create Them?, 307 
JAMA 2261, 2261-62 (2012); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Why Accountable Care Organizations 
Are Not 1990s Managed Care Redux, 307 JAMA 2263, 2263-64 (2012). 
 88 Greaney, supra note 86, at 186-87. 
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of treatment. As a result, local consolidation can be enough to 
insulate hospitals from the competitive pressures that other 
businesses face from companies in neighboring communities. 
Courts have especially failed to account for the fact that 
the widespread existence of health care insurance makes health 
care markets more susceptible to anti-competitive behavior than 
other markets. Normally, even businesses with substantial 
market power face constraints on their ability to raise prices. As 
prices rise, some consumers will be priced out of the market. 
Health care providers do not have to worry as much about 
pricing their customers out of the market because health 
insurance makes it possible for patients to afford even very 
expensive care.89 
Courts not only may incorrectly assume that health care 
decisions are made in the same way as other consumer 
decisions. Courts also may make the opposite mistake—they 
may wrongly conclude that participants in health care markets 
operate differently than their counterparts in other markets 
when they act in similar ways. As a result, judges may be too 
willing to excuse behavior by health care institutions that would 
elicit condemnation for organizations in other markets. For 
example, when not-for-profit hospitals have merged, some judges 
have overestimated the extent to which the hospitals’ not-for-
profit status would temper their anti-competitive behavior.90 
In short, when deciding whether hospital mergers are 
anti-competitive, courts may make two kinds of error. On one 
hand, judges may treat health care decisions similarly when 
they should be treated differently. On the other hand, judges may 
treat health care decisions differently when they should be 
treated similarly. When it comes to antitrust law, health care 
exceptionalism is underinclusive at some times and overinclusive 
at other times. 
The authority of a Restatement on Health Care could do 
much to ensure that judicial decisions about hospital mergers and 
 
 89 I am grateful to Syd Arak for this point, which also is made in Clark C. 
Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 89 
OR. L. REV. 847, 863-64 (2011). One might expect insurers to police the pricing 
practices of health care providers, but societal objections to health care rationing limit 
the ability of insurers to do so. Id. at 863 n.46. 
 90 Greaney, supra note 86, at 187-88; Richman, supra note 86, at 131-33; 
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 89, at 855-56. Other courts have not assumed that 
mergers among not-for-profit hospitals are more benign than mergers among for-profit 
hospitals, HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, at 1370. Analyses of hospital mergers by 
the Federal Trade Commission and the Massachusetts attorney general have 
discredited the view that not-for-profit hospitals will not exploit their market power. 
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 89, at 854-57. 
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other potentially anti-competitive behavior more accurately take 
account of the special nature of the market for health care. 
A Restatement also could help courts sort through 
empirical evidence that often is not clear. Courts do not 
necessarily ignore empirical evidence in their health care 
antitrust decisions, but they may draw incorrect conclusions 
from data that can point in different directions.91 A Restatement 
could provide important guidance on key empirical questions 
for the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past few decades, as health care law has 
matured as a field of legal theory and practice, judges, 
legislators, and other government officials have become 
increasingly involved with major questions of legal policy for the 
health care sector. Often, these questions are quite complicated, 
and their resolution may suffer from the absence of an 
authoritative resource for policy makers. A Restatement of 
Health Care Law could do much to promote the development of 
appropriate legal rules in the future. 
 
 91 Richman, supra note 86, at 130-35. 
